Thumbnail
Access Restriction
Subscribed

Author Faltings, B.
Source IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Content type Text
Publisher Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
File Format PDF
Copyright Year ©2004
Language English
Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Special computer methods
Subject Keyword Costs ♦ Power grids
Abstract Many situations present a social choice problem where different self-interested agents have to agree on joint, co-ordinated decisions. For example, power companies have to agree on how to use the power grid, and airlines have to agree on how to schedule takeoffs and landings. Mechanisms for social choice are called incentive-compatible when cooperative behavior is optimal for all parties. The most well-known examples of incentive-compatible mechanisms are auctions. However, the party that receives the auction revenue has an incentive to manipulate the outcome to increase the revenue. For example, a power gird operator has an interest to reduce capacity and drive up prices. Conversely, if it provides sufficient capacity to every user it derives no revenue to cover its costs. We present a novel mechanism for social choice that is incentive-compatible without generating a payment surplus. We give several examples of applications where it solves the social choice problem without unwanted incentives, and provides significantly better overall utility than any other known mechanism.
Description Author affiliation: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL), Switzerland (Faltings, B.)
ISBN 0769521002
Educational Role Student ♦ Teacher
Age Range above 22 year
Educational Use Research ♦ Reading
Education Level UG and PG
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2004-09-20
Publisher Place China
Rights Holder Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Size (in Bytes) 4.73 MB
Page Count 7
Starting Page 8
Ending Page 14


Source: IEEE Xplore Digital Library