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Author Shu-Heng Chen ♦ Chih-Chi Ni
Source IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Content type Text
Publisher Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
File Format PDF
Copyright Year ©1997
Language English
Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Subject Keyword Algorithm design and analysis ♦ Genetic algorithms ♦ Game theory ♦ Economic forecasting ♦ Uncertainty ♦ Turning
Abstract Recently, genetic algorithms have been extensively applied to modeling bounded rationality in game theory. While these applications advance our understanding or game theory, they have generated some new phenomena which have not been well treated in conventional game theory. We systemize the study of one of these new phenomena, namely, coevolutionary instability. We exemplify the basic properties of coevolutionary instability by the chain store game, which is the game frequently used to study the role of reputation effects in economics. In addition, we point out that, while, due to uncertainty effects, Nash equilibria can no longer be stable, they can still help us predict the dynamic process of the game. In particular, we can see that the dynamic process of the game is well captured by a few Nash equilibria and the transition among them. A careful study can uncover several interesting patterns. We show the impact of uncertainty on these patterns.
Description Author affiliation: AI-ECON Res. Group, Nat. Chengchi Univ., Taipei, Taiwan (Shu-Heng Chen)
ISBN 0780339495
Educational Role Student ♦ Teacher
Age Range above 22 year
Educational Use Research ♦ Reading
Education Level UG and PG
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 1997-04-13
Publisher Place USA
Rights Holder Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Size (in Bytes) 616.72 kB
Page Count 6
Starting Page 703
Ending Page 708


Source: IEEE Xplore Digital Library