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Author Jacquemet, Nicolas ♦ Zylbersztejn, Adam
Source Hyper Articles en Ligne (HAL)
Content type Text
File Format PDF
Language English
Subject Keyword Coordination game ♦ cheap-talk ♦ Jeu de coordination ♦ communication ♦ observation. ♦ shs ♦ Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and finances
Abstract This paper reports experimental results from a one-shot game with two Nash equilibria: the first one is efficient, the second one relies on weakly dominated strategies. The experimental treatments consider three information-enhancing mechanisms in the game: simple repetition, cheap-talk messages and observation of past actions from the current interaction partner. Our experimental results show the use of dominated strategies is quite widespread. Any kind of information (through learning, words or actions) increases efficiency. As regards coordination, we find that good history performs better than good messages; but bad history performs worse than bad messages.
ISSN 1955611X
Educational Use Research
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2010-07-01