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Author Barenghi, Alessandro ♦ Bertoni, Guido M. ♦ Breveglieri, Luca ♦ Pelosi, Gerardo ♦ Sanfilippo, Stefano ♦ Susella, Ruggero
Source ACM Digital Library
Content type Text
Publisher Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
File Format PDF
Copyright Year ©2016
Language English
Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Subject Keyword Digital signatures ♦ ECDSA ♦ Cryptography ♦ Elliptic curve digital signature algorithm ♦ Embedded systems security ♦ Fault attacks
Abstract Elliptic curve cryptosystems proved to be well suited for securing systems with constrained resources like embedded and portable devices. In a fault-based attack, errors are induced during the computation of a cryptographic primitive, and the results are collected to derive information about the secret key safely stored in the device. We introduce a novel attack methodology to recover the secret key employed in implementations of the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm. Our attack exploits the information leakage induced when altering the execution of the modular arithmetic operations used in the signature primitive and does not rely on the underlying elliptic curve mathematical structure, thus being applicable to all standardized curves. We provide both a validation of the feasibility of the attack, even employing common off-the-shelf hardware to perform the required computations, and a low-cost countermeasure to counteract it.
Description Author Affiliation: STMicroelectronics, Agrate Brianza, Italy (Bertoni, Guido M.; Susella, Ruggero); Politecnico di Milano, Milano, Italy (Barenghi, Alessandro; Breveglieri, Luca; Pelosi, Gerardo; Sanfilippo, Stefano)
ISSN 15504832
Age Range 18 to 22 years ♦ above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2016-04-01
Publisher Place New York
e-ISSN 15504840
Journal ACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems (JETC)
Volume Number 13
Issue Number 1
Page Count 26
Starting Page 1
Ending Page 26

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Source: ACM Digital Library