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Author Felegyhazi, M. ♦ Hubaux, J.-P. ♦ Buttyan, L.
Sponsorship IEEE Computer Society
Source IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Content type Text
Publisher Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
File Format PDF
Copyright Year ©2002
Language English
Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Subject Keyword Intelligent networks ♦ Ad hoc networks ♦ Game theory ♦ Network topology ♦ Mobile ad hoc networks ♦ Spread spectrum communication ♦ Graph theory ♦ Nash equilibrium ♦ Microwave integrated circuits ♦ Nash equilibrium. ♦ Ad hoc networks ♦ cooperation ♦ graph theory ♦ game theory
Abstract In self-organizing ad hoc networks, all the networking functions rely on the contribution of the participants. As a basic example, nodes have to forward packets for each other in order to enable multihop communication. In recent years, incentive mechanisms have been proposed to give nodes incentive to cooperate, especially in packet forwarding. However, the need for these mechanisms was not formally justified. In this paper, we address the problem of whether cooperation can exist without incentive mechanisms. We propose a model,based on game theory and graph theory to investigate equilibrium conditions of packet forwarding strategies. We prove theorems about the equilibrium conditions for both cooperative and noncooperative strategies. We perform simulations to estimate the probability that the conditions for a cooperative equilibrium hold in randomly generated network scenarios.. As the problem is involved, we deliberately restrict ourselves to a static configuration. We conclude that in static ad hoc networks where the relationships between the nodes are likely to be stab le-cooperation needs to be encouraged.
Description Author affiliation :: Swiss Fed. Inst. of Technol., Lausanne, Switzerland
ISSN 15361233
Education Level UG and PG
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2006-05-01
Publisher Place U.S.A.
Rights Holder Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Volume Number 5
Issue Number 5
Size (in Bytes) 2.09 MB
Page Count 14
Starting Page 463
Ending Page 476


Source: IEEE Xplore Digital Library