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Author Daskalakis, Constantinos
Source ACM Digital Library
Content type Text
Publisher Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
File Format PDF
Language English
Subject Domain (in DDC) Social sciences ♦ Economics ♦ Microeconomics & related topics
Subject Keyword Auctions ♦ Multidimensional mechanism design
Abstract The best way to sell n items to a buyer who values each of them independently and uniformly randomly in [c, c+1] is to bundle them together, as long as c is large enough. Still, for any c, the grand bundling mechanism is never optimal for large enough n, despite the sharp concentration of the buyer's total value for the items as n grows. Optimal multi-item mechanisms are rife with unintuitive properties, making multi-item generalizations of Myerson's celebrated mechanism a daunting task. We survey recent work on the structure and computational complexity of revenue-optimal multi-item mechanisms, providing structural as well as algorithmic generalizations of Myerson's result to multi-item settings.
Description Affiliation: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Daskalakis, Constantinos)
Age Range 18 to 22 years ♦ above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2003-03-01
Publisher Place New York
Journal ACM SIGecom Exchanges (SECO)
Volume Number 14
Issue Number 1
Page Count 35
Starting Page 41
Ending Page 75


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Source: ACM Digital Library