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Author Immorlica, Nicole ♦ Roth, Aaron ♦ Dughmi, Shaddin
Source ACM Digital Library
Content type Text
Publisher Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
File Format PDF
Language English
Subject Domain (in DDC) Social sciences ♦ Economics ♦ Microeconomics & related topics
Subject Keyword Signaling ♦ Mechanism design ♦ Auctions
Abstract We consider auction settings where the seller is constrained in the amount and nature of information he may reveal about the good being sold. This is encountered, for example, in online advertising auctions, where communicating precise details of every viewer to interested advertisers is impractical, costly, and possibly socially undesirable. We initiate the study of constrained signaling in such settings, where a seller must choose which information to reveal subject to exogenous constraints on the signaling policy. We consider a seller employing the second-price auction, and present algorithms and hardness results for approximating the welfare and revenue maximizing signaling policies under a variety of constraints.
Description Affiliation: University of Southern California (Dughmi, Shaddin) || University of Pennsylvania (Roth, Aaron) || Microsoft Research (Immorlica, Nicole)
Age Range 18 to 22 years ♦ above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2003-03-01
Publisher Place New York
Journal ACM SIGecom Exchanges (SECO)
Volume Number 12
Issue Number 1
Page Count 4
Starting Page 53
Ending Page 56


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Source: ACM Digital Library