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Author Fortnow, Lance
Source EconStor
Content type Text
Publisher Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science cEvanston
File Format PDF
Language English
Subject Domain (in DDC) Social sciences ♦ Economics
Abstract Tennenholtz (GEB 2004) developed Program Equilibrium to model play in a finite two-player game where each player can base their strategy on the other player's strategies. Tennenholtz's model allowed each player to produce a \loop-free computer program that had access to the code for both players. He showed a folk theorem where any mixed-strategy individually rational play could be an equilibrium payoff in this model even in a one-shot game. Kalai et al. gave a general folk theorem for correlated play in a more generic commitment model. We develop a new model of program equilibrium using general computational models and discounting the payoffs based on the computation time used. We give an even more general folk theorem giving correlated-strategy payoffs down to the pure minimax of each player. We also show equilibrium in other games not covered by the earlier work.
Part of series Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science x1473
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2008-01-01
Rights Holder http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen