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Author Sadiraj, Vjollca ♦ Tuinstra, Jan ♦ van Winden, Frans
Source EconStor
Content type Text
Publisher Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
File Format PDF
Language English
Subject Domain (in DDC) Social sciences ♦ Economics
Subject Keyword spatial voting models ♦ electoral competition ♦ winning set ♦ interest groups ♦ Wahlkampf ♦ Wahlverhalten ♦ Interessenvertretung ♦ Public Choice ♦ Theorie ♦ Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ♦ Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Abstract Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior, these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.
Part of series CESifo Working Paper x3014
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2010-01-01
Publisher Place Munich
Rights Holder