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Author Koch, Alexander K. ♦ Peyrache, Eloïc
Source EconStor
Content type Text
Publisher Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
File Format PDF
Language English
Subject Domain (in DDC) Social sciences ♦ Economics
Abstract Incentive theory predicts that contract terms should respond to differences in agents' productivities. Firms' practice of anonymous contracts thus appears puzzling. We show that such a one-size-fits-all approach can be reconciled with standard agency theory if careers are marked by frequent transitions between employers, and agents have career concerns because complete long-term contracts are not feasible.
Part of series IZA Discussion Papers x2463
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2006-01-01
Publisher Place Bonn
Rights Holder http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen