Access Restriction

Author Djajić, Slobodan ♦ Michael, Michael S.
Source EconStor
Content type Text
Publisher Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
File Format PDF
Language English
Subject Domain (in DDC) Social sciences ♦ Economics
Subject Keyword temporary migration ♦ remittances ♦ migration policy ♦ Internationale Arbeitsmobilität ♦ Saisonarbeitskräfte ♦ Migrationspolitik ♦ Spieltheorie ♦ Nash-Gleichgewicht ♦ Wohlfahrtseffekt ♦ Theorie ♦ International Migration
Abstract This paper examines the interaction between migration policies of the host and source countries in the context of a model of guest-worker migration. For the host, the objective is to provide low-cost labor for its employers while avoiding illegal immigration. It optimizes over these objectives by setting the time limit of a guest-worker permit. The source country seeks remittance flows and return migration by offering fiscal benefits to returnees. Within this framework, we solve for the Nash equilibrium values of the migration policy instruments and compare them with the ones that emerge in a cooperative setting.
Part of series CESifo Working Paper x2811
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2009-01-01
Publisher Place Munich
Rights Holder