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Author de Jong, Philip R. ♦ Lindeboom, Maarten ♦ van der Klaauw, Bas
Source EconStor
Content type Text
Publisher Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
File Format PDF
Language English
Subject Domain (in DDC) Social sciences ♦ Economics
Subject Keyword disability insurance ♦ experiment ♦ policy evaluation ♦ sickness absenteeism ♦ self-screening ♦ Behindertenpolitik ♦ Behinderte Arbeitskräfte ♦ Versicherung ♦ Fehlzeit ♦ Kontrolle ♦ Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse ♦ Niederlande ♦ Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy ♦ Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Abstract This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits.
Part of series IZA Discussion Papers x1981
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2006-01-01
Publisher Place Bonn
Rights Holder http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen