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Author Xiaoping Liu ♦ Siying Zhang
Sponsorship IEEE Control Systems Society
Source IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Content type Text
Publisher Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
File Format PDF
Copyright Year ©1963
Language English
Subject Domain (in DDC) Natural sciences & mathematics ♦ Physics ♦ Electricity & electronics
Subject Keyword Cost function ♦ Sufficient conditions ♦ Resource management ♦ Pricing ♦ Robustness ♦ Incentive schemes
Abstract An optimal incentive strategy by which the leader suffers the least losses in punishing the follower's deviation from the decision desired by the leader is defined. Sufficient conditions for the existence of optimal incentive strategy are given. Static and dynamic leader-follower games with quadratic cost functionals are investigated. It is shown that leader-follower games with quadratic cost functionals admit optimal incentive strategies under the follower's decision variable being scalar, there exists a unique linear optimal incentive strategy. Such an incentive strategy can be explicitly determined.<<ETX>>
Description Author affiliation :: Dept. of Autom. Control, Northeast Univ. of Technol., Liaoning, China
ISSN 00189286
Education Level UG and PG
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 1992-12-01
Publisher Place U.S.A.
Rights Holder Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Volume Number 37
Issue Number 12
Size (in Bytes) 390.30 kB
Page Count 5
Starting Page 1957
Ending Page 1961


Source: IEEE Xplore Digital Library