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Author Papadimitriou, Christos H. ♦ Roughgarden, Tim
Source ACM Digital Library
Content type Text
Publisher Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
File Format PDF
Copyright Year ©2008
Language English
Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Subject Keyword Correlated equilibria ♦ Nash equilibria ♦ Complexity of equilibria
Abstract We develop polynomial-time algorithms for finding correlated equilibria—a well-studied notion of rationality that generalizes the Nash equilibrium—in a broad class of succinctly representable multiplayer games, encompassing graphical games, anonymous games, polymatrix games, congestion games, scheduling games, local effect games, as well as several generalizations. Our algorithm is based on a variant of the existence proof due to Hart and Schmeidler, and employs linear programming duality, the ellipsoid algorithm, Markov chain steady state computations, as well as application-specific methods for computing multivariate expectations over product distributions. For anonymous games and graphical games of bounded tree-width, we provide a different polynomial-time algorithm for optimizing an arbitrary linear function over the set of correlated equilibria of the game. In contrast to our sweeping positive results for computing an arbitrary correlated equilibrium, we prove that optimizing over correlated equilibria is NP-hard in all of the other classes of games that we consider.
ISSN 00045411
Age Range 18 to 22 years ♦ above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2008-08-06
Publisher Place New York
e-ISSN 1557735X
Journal Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Volume Number 55
Issue Number 3
Page Count 29
Starting Page 1
Ending Page 29


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Source: ACM Digital Library