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Author Daskalakis, Constantinos ♦ Goldberg, Paul W. ♦ Papadimitriou, Christos H.
Source ACM Digital Library
Content type Text
Publisher Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
File Format PDF
Language English
Abstract How long does it take until economic agents converge to an equilibrium? By studying the complexity of the problem of computing a mixed Nash equilibrium in a game, we provide evidence that there are games in which convergence to such an equilibrium takes prohibitively long. Traditionally, computational problems fall into two classes: those that have a polynomial-time algorithm and those that are NP-hard. However, the concept of NP-hardness cannot be applied to the rare problems where "every instance has a solution"---for example, in the case of games Nash's theorem asserts that every game has a mixed equilibrium (now known as the Nash equilibrium, in honor of that result). We show that finding a Nash equilibrium is complete for a class of problems called PPAD, containing several other known hard problems; all problems in PPAD share the same style of proof that every instance has a solution.
Description Affiliation: University of Liverpool (Goldberg, Paul W.) || UC Berkeley (Daskalakis, Constantinos; Papadimitriou, Christos H.)
Age Range 18 to 22 years ♦ above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2005-08-01
Publisher Place New York
Journal Communications of the ACM (CACM)
Volume Number 52
Issue Number 2
Page Count 9
Starting Page 89
Ending Page 97


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Source: ACM Digital Library