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Author Cosnita, Andreea ♦ Tropeano, Jean-Philippe
Source Hyper Articles en Ligne (HAL)
Content type Text
Publisher Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - UMR 8174
File Format PDF
Language English
Subject Keyword merger remedies ♦ Merger control ♦ efficiency defence ♦ merger remedies. ♦ Contrôle des fusions ♦ procédure d' «efficiency defence» ♦ remèdes des fusions. ♦ shs ♦ Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and finances
Abstract The efficiency defence was long delayed in the European merger control due to costly implementation issues. In this paper we argue that the upstream consequences of the efficiency defence should equally be considered, namely the improvement of the distribution of notified mergers through the incentives it provides towards more efficient mergers. First of all, we show that even if the Competition Authority may not tell apart the mergers that rightfully invoke the efficiency defence from those that do not, allowing such a procedure can lead to a lower post-merger price. Secondly, we study the impact of merger remedies on the incentives conveyed by the efficiency defence, and conclude on the optimal design of the efficiency defence procedure.
ISSN 16240340
Educational Use Research
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2006-04-01