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Author Chen, Wu ♦ Zhang, Dongmo ♦ Wu, Maonian
Source SpringerLink
Content type Text
Publisher Higher Education Press
File Format PDF
Copyright Year ©2015
Language English
Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Subject Keyword bargaining ♦ logic programming ♦ sequential model ♦ abduction ♦ Computer Science
Abstract This paper proposes a sequential model of bargaining specifying reasoning processes of an agent behind bargaining procedures. We encode agents’ background knowledge, demands, and bargaining constraints in logic programs and represent bargaining outcomes in answer sets. We assume that in each bargaining situation, each agent has a set of goals to achieve, which are normally unachievable without an agreement among all the agents who are involved in the bargaining. Through an alternating-offers procedure, an agreement among bargaining agents may be reached by abductive reasoning.We show that the procedure converges to a Nash equilibrium if each agent makes rational offers/counter-offers in each round. In addition, the sequential model also has a number of desirable properties, such as mutual commitments, individual rationality, satisfactoriness, and honesty.
ISSN 20952228
Age Range 18 to 22 years ♦ above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2015-03-30
Publisher Institution Chinese Universities
Publisher Place Beijing
e-ISSN 20952236
Journal Frontiers of Computer Science in China
Volume Number 9
Issue Number 3
Page Count 11
Starting Page 474
Ending Page 484


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Source: SpringerLink