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Author Mizuno, Ryo
Source CiteSeerX
Content type Text
File Format PDF
Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Subject Keyword No-treat Equilibrium Tournament Game Externality ♦ No-treat Equilibrium ♦ Common Interest ♦ Various Notion ♦ Real Life ♦ Certain Condition ♦ Power Structure
Abstract Abstract. We consider a situation where coalitions are formed to divide a resource. As in real life, the value of a payoff to a given agent is allowed to depend on the payoff to other agents with whom he shares a common interest. There are various notions of equilibrium for this type of game, including the core and no-treat equilibrium. These stabilities may exist or not, depending on the power structure and the rule for allocating the resource. It is shown that under certain conditions, the no-treat equilibrium can exist even though the core is empty.
Educational Role Student ♦ Teacher
Age Range above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG ♦ Career/Technical Study
Learning Resource Type Article