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Author Huang, Dijiang ♦ Mehta, Manish ♦ Medhi, Deep ♦ Harn, Lein
Source CiteSeerX
Content type Text
File Format PDF
Language English
Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Subject Keyword Fabrication Attack ♦ Node Fabrication Attack ♦ New Sensor ♦ Compromised Secret Key ♦ Recent Proposal ♦ Uncompromised Sensor ♦ Several Pairwise Key Scheme ♦ Secure Communication ♦ Key Pool ♦ Low Power Sensor Device ♦ Random Capture ♦ Large Area ♦ Tamper-resistant Hardware ♦ Pair-wise Key Scheme ♦ Location-aware Key Management Scheme ♦ Capture Attack ♦ Node Capture Attack ♦ Secret Key ♦ Captured Node ♦ Sensor System ♦ Performance Analysis ♦ Deploy Sensor ♦ Known Deployment Information ♦ In-telligent Attacker ♦ Structured Key Pool ♦ Preinstalled Key ♦ Wireless Sensor Network ♦ Large Number ♦ Sensor Network ♦ Deployment Information ♦ Grid-group Scheme ♦ Large Key Pool ♦ Fabricated Sensor ♦ Memory Requirement
Description 2nd ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks (SASN) 2004
Sensor networks are composed of a large number of low power sensor devices. For secure communication among sensors, secret keys must be established between them. Re-cently, several pairwise key schemes have been proposed for large distributed sensor networks. These schemes randomly select a set of keys from a key pool and install the keys in the memory of each sensor. After deployment, the sensors can set up keys by using the preinstalled keys. Due to lack of tamper-resistant hardware, the sensor networks are vul-nerable to node capture attacks. The information gained from captured nodes can be used to compromise communi-cation among uncompromised sensors. Du et al. [1], Liu and Ning [2] proposed to use the known deployment information to reduce the memory requirements and mitigate the conse-quences of node capture attack. Our analysis shows that the assumption of random capture of sensors is too weak. An in-telligent attacker can selectively capture sensors to get more information with less efforts. In addition to selective node capture attack, all recent proposals are vulnerable to node fabrication attack, in which an attacker can fabricate new sensors by manipulating the compromised secret keys and then deploy the fabricated sensors into the sensor system. To counter these attacks, we propose a grid-group scheme which uses known deployment information. Unlike the pair-wise key scheme using deployment information proposed by Du et al., we uniformly deploy sensors in a large area; in-stead of randomly distributing keys from a large key pool to each sensor, we systematically distribute secret keys to each sensor from a structured key pool. Our performance analysis shows that our scheme requires less number of keys preinstalled for each sensor and is resilient to selective node capture attack and node fabrication attack.
Educational Role Student ♦ Teacher
Age Range above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG ♦ Career/Technical Study
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2004-01-01