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Author Bhattacharjee, Rajat
Source CiteSeerX
Content type Text
Publisher ACM Press
File Format PDF
Language English
Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Subject Keyword Reputation System ♦ Ebay-like Reputation System ♦ Transaction Cost ♦ Binary Feedback Reputation System ♦ Practical Reputation System ♦ Empirical Experiment ♦ Bad Mouthing ♦ Preliminary Study ♦ Third Workshop ♦ Ballot Stuffing ♦ Peer-to-peer System ♦ Explicit Relation ♦ Simplified Model ♦ Fake Transaction ♦ Reputation Premium
Description We present a preliminary study on the robustness of binary feedback reputation systems (e.g. eBay) to ballot stuffing and bad mouthing. In a feedback based reputation system, a seller can collude with other buyers to undertake fake transactions in order to enhance her reputation. This problem is referred to as ballot stuffing. A seller can also be targeted by a group of buyers to deliberately lower her reputation. This problem is referred to as bad mouthing. For the reputations to be meaningful, any practical reputation system needs to be resistant to these problems. We use a simplified model to give an explicit relation between the reputation premium and the transaction cost that needs to hold in order to avoid ballot stuffing. Thus we draw attention to the necessity of transaction costs for a well functioning reputation system. Our conclusions are confirmed by empirical experiments on eBay. 1
Educational Role Student ♦ Teacher
Age Range above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG ♦ Career/Technical Study
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2005-01-01
Publisher Institution In: P2PECON ’05: Proceeding of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems