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Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Abstract This thesis investigates two aspects of insurance theory. Essays I, II and III deal with the ownership structure in the insurance industry. Essays IV and V deal with the effects of background risks on an individual’s insurance decision against a given risk. Essay I uses game theory to analyze mutual contracts. Whether or not there are pure risk premiums is assumed to distinguish mutual contracts from insurance contracts. It is found that the mutual game with the absence of pure risk premiums has a nonempty core. Thus, stable mutual sharing is possible. However, the Pareto-efficient allocation may not be in the core, as opposed to the insurance game in which the Pareto can be in the core. In Essay II, a bargaining model is used to study how individuals in a mutual society design mutual contracts in order to share their risks. It is found that, 1) there is a general consistence between the mutual and insurance contracts: The same risk premium is required against the same risk and the high-risks are required to pay higher risk premiums than the low-risks; 2) There are situations where the mutual contract requires only an assessment of the relative value of the probabilities of losses, which shows an advantage of the mutual contract over the insurance contract because the insurance contract generally requires an assessment of the
Educational Role Student ♦ Teacher
Age Range above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG ♦ Career/Technical Study
Learning Resource Type Thesis