Thumbnail
Access Restriction
Open

Author Deck, Cary A. ♦ Wilson, Bart J.
Source CiteSeerX
Content type Text
File Format PDF
Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Abstract Abstract: A pricing mechanism for product evaluations can theoretically increase efficiency by voluntarily eliciting an evaluation that would otherwise not be provided. This paper uses a controlled laboratory experiment to test the performance of four market mechanisms to provide product evaluations: uniform price sealed bid, discriminatory price sealed bid, English clock, and Dutch clock auctions. Our results indicate for this nonrivalrous product that (1) each of these institutions improves social welfare and (2) the four mechanisms are behaviorally equivalent. This second point is particularly noteworthy given that differing behavior is routinely observed in private value auctions with certain valuations.
Educational Role Student ♦ Teacher
Age Range above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG ♦ Career/Technical Study
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2002-01-01