Access Restriction

Author Cremers, Cas J. F.
Source CiteSeerX
Content type Text
File Format PDF
Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Subject Keyword Forward Secrecy ♦ Weak Perfect Forward Secrecy ♦ Key Compromise Impersonation ♦ Eck Security Model ♦ Security Guarantee ♦ Many Recent Key Exchange ♦ Exact Relation ♦ Security Model ♦ Unreported Flaw ♦ Proven Secure ♦ Model Attack ♦ Protocol Security Proof
Abstract Abstract. Many recent key exchange (KE) protocols have been proven secure in the CK, CK-HMQV, or eCK security models. The exact relation between these security models, and hence between the security guarantees provided by the protocols, is unclear. First, we show that the CK, CK-HMQV, and eCK security models are formally incomparable. Second, we show that these models are also practically incomparable, by providing for each model attacks that are not considered by the other models. Our analysis enables us to find several previously unreported flaws in existing protocol security proofs. We identify the causes of these flaws and show how they can be avoided.
Educational Role Student ♦ Teacher
Age Range above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG ♦ Career/Technical Study
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2010-01-01