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Author Auction, Vickrey ♦ Glowicka, Ela ♦ Beck, Jonathan ♦ Glowickaa, Ela ♦ Becka, Jonathan
Source CiteSeerX
Content type Text
File Format PDF
Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Subject Keyword Reserve Price Commitment ♦ Seller Cannot Commit ♦ Standard Sealed-bid Second-price Auction ♦ Private Value ♦ One-shot Auction ♦ Optimal Reserve Price ♦ Simple Explanation ♦ Reserve Price ♦ Announced Reserve Price
Abstract 2006 This note provides a simple explanation why sellers rarely set optimal reserve prices in one-shot auctions. In a standard sealed-bid second-price auction, bidders with private values do not bid truthfully if the seller cannot commit to her announced reserve price. Consequently, expected revenue may be lower than without the an-nouncement of a reserve price.
Educational Role Student ♦ Teacher
Age Range above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG ♦ Career/Technical Study