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Author Jaramillo, Paula ♦ Kayi, Çagatay ♦ Klijn, Flip
Source CiteSeerX
Content type Text
File Format PDF
Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Subject Keyword Filled Position ♦ Equilibrium Outcome ♦ Welfare Level ♦ Matching Market ♦ Exhaustive Class ♦ Student-optimal Stable Matching Mechanism ♦ Weakly Dominant Strategy ♦ Responsive Preference ♦ Stable Matching ♦ So-called Rural Hospital Theorem Cannot ♦ Unstable Equilibrium Outcome ♦ True Preference ♦ Hospital-optimal Stable Matchings ♦ Important Consequence ♦ Multiple Position ♦ Paper Study ♦ Particular Equilibrium ♦ Stable Matchings ♦ Full Set
Abstract This paper studies many–to–one matching markets where each student is assigned to a hospital. Each hospital has possibly multiple positions and responsive preferences. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) showed that there can be unstable equilibrium outcomes. We prove that any stable matching can be obtained in some equilibrium. We also show that the exhaustive class of dropping strategies does not necessarily generate the full set of equilibrium outcomes. Finally, we find that the so-called ‘rural hospital theorem ’ cannot be extended to the set of equilibrium outcomes and that welfare levels are in general unrelated to the set of stable matchings. Two important consequences are that, contrary to one–to–one matching markets, (a) filled positions depend on the particular equilibrium that is reached and (b) welfare levels are not bounded by the student and hospital-optimal stable matchings (with respect to the true preferences).
Educational Role Student ♦ Teacher
Age Range above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG ♦ Career/Technical Study
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2013-01-01