Thumbnail
Access Restriction
Open

Author Archibald, Christopher ♦ Shoham, Yoav
Source CiteSeerX
Content type Text
File Format PDF
Language English
Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Subject Keyword Stochastic Game ♦ Icga Billiards Tournament ♦ Recent Computer Olympiad ♦ International Computer Game Association ♦ Basic Question ♦ A.i. Research ♦ Formal Model ♦ Billiards Game ♦ Heuristic Algorithmic Aspect ♦ Extensive Form Game ♦ Novel Analysis ♦ Finite Version ♦ Two-player Game ♦ Certain Condition ♦ Unique Challenge ♦ Infinite Case ♦ Recursive Game
Description International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS)
Two-player games of billiards, of the sort seen in recent Computer Olympiads held by the International Computer Games Association, are an emerging area with unique challenges for A.I. research. Complementing the heuristic/algorithmic aspect of billiards, of the sort brought to the fore in the ICGA billiards tournaments, we investigate formal models of such games. The modeling is surprisingly subtle. While sharing features with existing models (including stochastic games, games on a square, recursive games, and extensive form games), our model is distinct, and consequently requires novel analysis. We focus on the basic question of whether the game has an equilibrium. For finite versions of the game it is not hard to show the existence of a pure strategy Markov perfect Nash equilibrium. In the infinite case, it can be shown that under certain conditions a stationary pure strategy Markov perfect Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist.
Educational Role Student ♦ Teacher
Age Range above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG ♦ Career/Technical Study
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2009-01-01