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Author Auctions, First-Price ♦ Marx, Leslie M. ♦ Sun, Peng
Source CiteSeerX
Content type Text
File Format PDF
Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Subject Keyword Mechanism Design ♦ Rst-price Auction ♦ Bidder Collusion ♦ Pro Table ♦ Economics Literature ♦ Certain Environment Collusion ♦ Rstprice Auction ♦ Cartel Cannot ♦ Prior Literature ♦ Game Group Decision ♦ Subject Classi Cation ♦ Mechanism Design Problem ♦ Common Auction Format ♦ Bidding Auction
Abstract We demonstrate the use of linear programming techniques in the analysis of mechanism design problems. We use these techniques to analyze the extent to which a …rst-price auction is robust to collusion when, contrary to some prior literature on collusion at …rst-price auctions, the cartel cannot prevent its members from bidding at the auction. In this case, cartels have been shown to be less pro…table facing a …rst-price auction than facing other common auction formats, but we show the stronger result that in certain environments collusion at a …rst-price auction is not pro…table at all. Our results suggest that …rstprice auctions are more robust to collusion than previously believed. Subject classi…cations: Economics: mechanism design. Games/group decisions: Bidding/auctions. The economics literature on mechanism design provides techniques for analyzing how
Educational Role Student ♦ Teacher
Age Range above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG ♦ Career/Technical Study
Publisher Date 2008-01-01