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Author Yeh, Chun-Hsien
Source CiteSeerX
Content type Text
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Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Subject Keyword Alternative Characterization ♦ Airport Problem ♦ Academia Sinica ♦ Last Agent ♦ Public Facility ♦ Last-agent Cost Additivity ♦ Equal Treatment ♦ Sudho Lter ♦ Different Need ♦ Last-agent Consistency
Abstract We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a public facility among agents who have different needs for it. We show that the nucleolus is the only rule satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, last-agent cost additivity, and last-agent consistency. Our result reveals the importance of the last agent in characterizing the rule and generalizes that of Potters and Sudhölter (1999). Journal
Educational Role Student ♦ Teacher
Age Range above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG ♦ Career/Technical Study