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Author Halpern, Joseph Y. ♦ Pass, Rafael
Source CiteSeerX
Content type Text
File Format PDF
Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Subject Keyword Player Belief ♦ Conservative Belief ♦ Actual World Positive Probability ♦ Subjective Correlated Equilibrium ♦ Different Approach ♦ Common Support ♦ Common Prior ♦ Strong Rationalizability ♦ Common Conservative Belief
Abstract Players ’ beliefs may be incompatible, in the sense that player i can assign probability 1 to an event E to which player j assigns probability 0. One way to block incompatibility is to assume a common prior. We consider here a different approach: we require players ’ beliefs to be conser-vative, in the sense that all players must ascribe the actual world positive probability. We show that common conservative belief of rationality (CCBR) characterizes strategies in the support of a subjective correlated equilibrium where all players ’ beliefs have common support. We also define a notion of strong rationalizability, and show that this is characterized by CCBR. 1
Educational Role Student ♦ Teacher
Age Range above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG ♦ Career/Technical Study
Publisher Date 2014-01-01