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Author Chaplygin, Vladimir ♦ Hallett, Andrew Hughes ♦ Richter, Christian
Source CiteSeerX
Content type Text
File Format PDF
Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Subject Keyword Monetary Integration ♦ Ex-soviet Union ♦ Usual Disclaimer Applies ♦ Currency Union ♦ Potential Participant ♦ Strong Political Commitment ♦ Ex-soviet Country ♦ Asymmetric Pattern ♦ Conventional Technique ♦ Necessary Market Flexibility ♦ Market Flexibility ♦ Black Market ♦ Structural Symmetry ♦ Economic Feasibility ♦ Mutual Dependency
Abstract Abstract: The governments of 4 ex-Soviet countries recently discussed forming a currency union. We examine the economic feasibility of this union. Using conventional techniques, we find the arrangement is likely to founder on the lack of structural symmetry, the asymmetric pattern of shocks and the lack of market flexibility among the potential participants. Moreover, the union would be a unilateral one. It would therefore require an exceptionally strong political commitment to survive. Nevertheless there are some subtleties in the timing and pattern of mutual dependency between Russia and Kazakhstan (and to a much lesser extent, Belarus) which might allow a currency union with less strain. Otherwise, the black market will inevitably have to provide the necessary market flexibility.
Educational Role Student ♦ Teacher
Age Range above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG ♦ Career/Technical Study
Learning Resource Type Article