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Author Boudreau, James
Source CiteSeerX
Content type Text
File Format PDF
Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Subject Keyword Preference Structure ♦ Matching Market ♦ Random Path ♦ Stable Matching ♦ Various Preference Specification ♦ Arbitrary Matching ♦ Marriage Market ♦ Fundamental Preference Characteristic ♦ Decentralized Matching Market ♦ Intercorrelation Combine ♦ Random Mechanism ♦ Many Helpful Comment ♦ Preference Correlation ♦ Vicki Knoblauch ♦ Exponential Impact ♦ Vande Vate ♦ Simulated Experiment
Abstract This paper examines how preference correlation and intercorrelation combine to influence the length of a decentralized matching market's path to stability. In simulated experiments, marriage markets with various preference specifications begin at an arbitrary matching of couples and proceed toward stability via the random mechanism proposed by Roth and Vande Vate (1990). The results of these experiments reveal that fundamental preference characteristics are critical in predicting how long the market will take to reach a stable matching. In particular, intercorrelation and correlation are shown to have an exponential impact on the number of blocking pairs that must be randomly satisfied before stability is attained. The magnitude of the impact is dramatically different, however, depending on whether preferences are positively or negatively intercorrelated. I wish to thank Vicki Knoblauch for many helpful comments.
Educational Role Student ♦ Teacher
Age Range above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG ♦ Career/Technical Study
Learning Resource Type Article