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Author Jindapon, Paan ♦ Oyarzun, Carlos
Source CiteSeerX
Content type Text
File Format PDF
Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Subject Keyword Competitive Cheap Talk ♦ Neutral Sender ♦ Strategic Communication ♦ Sender-receiver Game ♦ Correlated Public Signal ♦ Object Quality ♦ Many Equilibrium ♦ Many Informed Sender ♦ Biased Sender ♦ Observed Quality ♦ Minimum Requirement ♦ Uninformed Receiver
Abstract We study strategic communication in some variations of the sender-receiver game where an uninformed receiver chooses an object on recommendations from many informed senders whose incentives are unknown to the receiver. In a game where some senders always truthfully report object’s quality and some are biased senders who communicate strategically, we find that an equilibrium always exists in this game and it is unique. If all senders are strategic and there exist some neutral senders whose objectives are aligned with the receiver’s, then many equilibria exist. These equilibria include one in which the neutral senders always tell the truth and a class of equilibria in which the neutral senders exaggerate when the observed quality is high enough. We generalize the analysis to situations where the receiver can observe a correlated public signal about each object and the receiver has a minimum requirement of quality.
Educational Role Student ♦ Teacher
Age Range above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG ♦ Career/Technical Study
Publisher Date 2008-01-01