Access Restriction

Author Guidry, David ♦ Burmester, Mike ♦ Liu, Xiuwen ♦ Jenkins, Jonathan ♦ Easton, Sean ♦ Allen, Josef
Source CiteSeerX
Content type Text
File Format PDF
Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Subject Keyword Substation Automation System ♦ Cyber-physical System ♦ Missed Command ♦ Entire System ♦ Power Utility System ♦ Physical Property ♦ Critical Infrastructure System ♦ Physical Constraint ♦ Resilient Substation Automation ♦ Performance Guarantee ♦ Novel Access Control Structure ♦ Cyberphysical System ♦ Underlying Physical Component ♦ Cyber Component ♦ Specified System Objective ♦ Trusted Computing Paradigm ♦ Estimated State ♦ Heterogeneous Component ♦ Trusted Platform Module
Abstract Abstract. Most critical infrastructure systems can be modeled as cyber-physical systems whose cyber components control the underlying physical components so as to optimize specified system objectives based on physical properties, physical constraints, and the current and estimated state of the system. Such systems usually require supports for security and performance guarantees: wrongly received or missed commands can render the entire system unstable. Yet, securing cyberphysical systems with heterogeneous components is still an open and challenging problem. In this paper, we propose techniques for resilient substation automation of power utility systems with security based on the trusted computing paradigm. By using trusted platform module (TPM)-enabled components and a novel access control structure that enforces need-to-get (availability) policies, we show how to develop IEC/TR 61850-90-5 compliant substation automation systems that are resilient. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach by analyzing and experimenting with an open source IEC/TR 61850-90-5 implementation. 1
Educational Role Student ♦ Teacher
Age Range above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG ♦ Career/Technical Study
Learning Resource Type Article