Access Restriction

Author Aggarwal, Divesh ♦ Dodis, Yevgeniy ♦ Lovett, Shachar
Source CiteSeerX
Content type Text
File Format PDF
Language English
Subject Domain (in DDC) Computer science, information & general works ♦ Data processing & computer science
Subject Keyword Encoded Message ♦ Advanced Cryptographic Assumption ♦ Many Realistic Application ♦ Split-state Model ♦ Non-interactive Zero-knowledge Proof ♦ Efficient Non-malleable Code ♦ Called Split-state Model ♦ Meaningful Security Guarantee ♦ Considerable Attention ♦ Non-malleable Code ♦ Unrelated Value ♦ Split-state Tampering Arises ♦ Modified Codeword ♦ Additive Combinatorics ♦ Natural Family ♦ Non-malleable Secret Sharing Scheme ♦ Tra-ditional Error-correction ♦ Original Message ♦ Random Oracle Model
Description Non-malleable codes provide a useful and meaningful security guarantee in situations where tra-ditional error-correction (and even error-detection) is impossible; for example, when the attacker can completely overwrite the encoded message. Informally, a code is non-malleable if the message contained in a modified codeword is either the original message, or a completely unrelated value. Although such codes do not exist if the family of “tampering functions ” F is completely unre-stricted, they are known to exist for many broad tampering families F. One such natural family is the family of tampering functions in the so called split-state model. Here the message m is encoded into two shares L and R, and the attacker is allowed to arbitrarily tamper with L and R individually. The split-state tampering arises in many realistic applications, such as the design of non-malleable secret sharing schemes, motivating the question of designing efficient non-malleable codes in this model. Prior to this work, non-malleable codes in the split-state model received considerable attention in the literature, but were constructed either (1) in the random oracle model [16], or (2) relied on advanced cryptographic assumptions (such as non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs and leakage-
Educational Role Student ♦ Teacher
Age Range above 22 year
Educational Use Research
Education Level UG and PG ♦ Career/Technical Study
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 2013-01-01
Journal Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC