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Author Stähler, Frank
Source EconStor
Content type Text
Publisher Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
File Format PDF
Copyright Year ©1992
Language English
Subject Domain (in DDC) Social sciences ♦ Economics
Subject Keyword Internationale Umweltpolitik ♦ Umweltschutz ♦ Spieltheorie ♦ Verhandlungstheorie ♦ Theorie
Abstract This paper questions the standard results of an international noncooperative reduction game through considering scope effects between reduction and adaptation policies. In particular, it demonstrates that scope effects can result in positively sloped reaction curves. The paper discusses also the role of different conjectures and corner solutions. It concludes that, compared to the well-known standard results, all these effects introduce a good deal of ambiguity surrounding any forecast which is based on purely theoretical grounds.
Part of series Kiel Working Paper x542
Learning Resource Type Article
Publisher Date 1992-01-01
Publisher Institution ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel, Hamburg
Publisher Place Kiel
Rights Holder